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tQtTESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Is a man who purposely places himself near the center of a 
national media event and then exploits that experience for 
his own personal gain a limited purpose public figure for 
discussions regarding that national media event?
2. Do Globe's First Amendment rights require recognition of a 
constitutionally-based privilege of neutral reportage?
3. Does actual malice sufficient to support punitive damages 
require more than a mere failure to discover the falsity of 
an accusation?
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
KHALID KHAWAR, ) No. S054868
)
Plaintiff and Respondent, ) Court of Appeal
) Case No. B08489
V. )
) Los Angeles
globe INTERNATIONAL, INC., ) County Superior
) Court Case No.
Defendant and Appellant. ) WEC 139685
-)
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary Statement
On March 14, 1990, Khalid Iqbal Khawar (Khawar) filed his 
second amended complaint against Globe International, Inc.
(Globe) seeking damages for defamation. (C.A.T. 137-41.) After 
trial the jury found that: (1) some statements in the Globe 
article defamed Khawar; (2) some statements in the article about 
Khawar were false; (3) Globe was negligent in failing to learn of 
the false facts before publication; (4) Globe's negligence was a 
cause of injury to Khawar; (5) Khawar was a private figure as of 
April, 1989; (6) Globe's article was an accurate and neutral
report of the charges made in Morrow's book. The Senator Must 
Die; and (7) Globe published the article with actual malice. 
(C.A.T. 2780-82.) The trial judge agreed that Khawar was a 
private figure. (R.T. 2735.) The trial judge disagreed with the 
jury, however, and ruled that Globe's article was not an accurate 
and neutral report of Morrow's book. (R.T. 2740.)
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The jury assessed damages totaling $675,000 against Globe 
for harm to Khawar's reputation, for emotional distress, and for 
presumed damages. (C.A.T. 2783.) In a separate trial phase, the 
jury awarded $500,000 in punitive damages. (C.A.T. 2791.)
Globe filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment. 
(C.A.T. 3130.) The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment. See 
formerly published at Khawar v. Globe Int'1^—Inc^, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 92, 111 (1996). The court held that: (1) Khawar was a 
private figure; (2) there was substantial evidence to support a 
finding of actual malice by Globe; and (3) California has not 
adopted the neutral reportage privilege with regard to private 
figures. ^ at 99-106. This Court then granted review.
Statement of Facts
On June 4, 1968, Khalid Khawar went to the Ambassador Hotel, 
obtained a press pass, and went to the Embassy room where the 
campaign for Robert Kennedy was located. (R.T. 1338.) Khawar 
wanted his picture taken with Kennedy so he gave his camera to a 
friend and got up on stage to stake out a position near where 
Kennedy would speak. (R.T. 1340, 1389-90.) The room was full of 
reporters and Khawar knew that he was likely to be in the photos 
that the reporters took of Kennedy. (R.T. 1339, 1345, 1348,
1389, 1390-91.) Kennedy was killed soon after he left the
Embassy room around midnight. (R.T. 1341.)
Khawar hung the picture of himself with Kennedy in his 
office. (R.T. 1357.) Khawar placed the photo where anyone 
meeting him in his office could see it. (R.T. 1358.) At least 
two thousand people saw the picture of Khawar with Kennedy. 
(R.T. 1359.) The picture hung next to a photo of Khawar with
President Zia of Pakistan. (R.T. 1358, 1422.)
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(C.T. 3144-45.) The article was written by John Blackburn, a 
reporter for Globe. (R.T. 1089-90.) Blackburn had interviewed 
Robert Morrow, the author of The Senator Must Die.^ (R.T. 1092- 
93.) Blackburn's article was based on the issues discussed in 
Morrow's book. (R.T. 1090-93, 1101-09.)
Morrow has written two other books on the assassinations of 
political leaders. (R.T, 704, 841, 883.) In addition, Morrow 
ran for congress in Maryland. (R.T, 883-84.) Moreover, Morrow 
provided information to United States Congressman Downing which 
helped to create the House Select Committee on Assassinations, 
(R.T. 1600.)
The Globe article detailed Morrow's accusations that Sirhan 
Sirhan had not fired the fatal shots, but rather that a man 
called Ali Ahmand was the actual killer.'^ (C.T. 3145.) In his 
book, Morrow pointed to Khawar in a photo of him standing near 
Kennedy, and indicated that Khawar was Ali Ahmand. (C.A.T. 156.)
Morrow did not name Khalid Khawar in his book, but wrote 
only that Ali Ahmand was also known as Khalid Iqbal. (R.T.
1123.) During interviews with the FBI and LAPD, Khawar did not 
give his name as Khalid Khawar, but instead as Khalid Iqbal.
(R.T. 1381, 1383.) Blackburn tried to locate Ali Ahmand through 
the Los Angeles telephone directory, but was unsuccessful. (R.T. 
1120-21.)
In 1989, Globe published an article entitled "Former CIA
Agent Claims: Iranians Killed Bobby Kennedy for the Mafia."
^ Blac)cburn was unsure if he interviewed or tried to interview other 
people related to the story. (R.T. 1123, 1127, 1140.)
As Khawar's own expert testified, the article was riddled with 
disclaiming phrases informing readers that Globe was not concurring 
with, but only reporting upon, Morrow's accusations. (R.T. 859-63.)
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In April of 1989, a former employee told Khawar about the 
Globe article. (R.T. 1357.) Khawar received phone threats, and 
his house and car were egged. (R.T. 1367, 1378-80.) Khawar filed 
a suit for defamation five months later. (R.T. 1368.) 
Approximately six months after the story was published, Khawar 
appeared on a local television program and denied Morrow's 
allegations. {R.T. 1398, 1400.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Khawar should be classified as a limited purpose public 
figure for the purposes of reporting on the assassination of 
Robert Kennedy. Khawar chose to stand near Kennedy so he could 
get his picture taken with him. Khawar used that same picture 
for nearly twenty years in his dealings with people in his 
office. Khawar used his voluntary interaction in a public matter 
for his own benefit. Khawar's actions were an assumption of risk 
for any negative consequences from public discussion of the 
event. Furthermore, the First Amendment purpose of protecting 
discussion on matters of public concern warrants finding Khawar 
to be a limited purpose public figure.
The court below violated Globe's First Amendment rights by 
refusing to recognize a neutral reportage privilege that would 
shield Globe from liability under the facts of this case. Globe 
proposes a formulation of the neutral reportage privilege that 
comports with current Supreme Court defamation jurisprudence, 
protects only that type of speech deserving of First Amendment 
protection, and provides the reputational interests of plaintiffs 
like Khawar a reasonable degree of protection. For these 
reasons, Globe's formulation of the neutral reportage privilege 
ameliorates the concerns of courts that have rejected other
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of the privilege. Finally, Globe met every 
j,gq^ijfement necessary to invoke its formulation of the neutral 
reportage privilege.
There is insufficient evidence for a finding of actual 
malice by Globe. Even though John Blackburn may not have been a 
credible witness, a jury may not infer subjective knowledge of 
falsity because they do not believe his assertions of ignorance 
as to the falsity of Morrow's allegations. Additionally, Globe's 
failure to investigate is not evidence of actual malice because 
Globe did not fail to investigate evidence which they knew of, or 
had been provided. Globe's failure to locate Khawar is not 
purposeful avoidance of falsity because Khawar's true name was 
unknown to Globe at the time of publication. Therefore, punitive 
damages are unwarranted in this case.
ARGUMENT
I. khawar is a public figure for the purposes of speech 
regarding the assassination of ROBERT KENNEDY.
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-73
(1964), the Supreme Court set out to balance the interests of the
individual's reputation with the right to free speech under the
First Amendment. The Court explained that freedom of speech upon
public matters is secured by the First Amendment. See id. at
269. However, because this freedom is not absolute, persons
injured by the abuse of that freedom can seek redress through a
defamation suit. To insure that this remedy does not infringe
upon the defendant's First Amendment rights to speak out on
matters of public concern, however, the Court held that the
plaintiff must prove actual malice to recover damages. See id.
at 283. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the
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Court limited the protection afforded defendants by the actual 
malice standard to defamation of public figures. at 347.
When a defamation action is brought, the standard of proof 
is determined by whether the plaintiff is a public or private 
figure. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347. To recover any damages, a
public figure must prove actual malice by the defendant. •
at 349. A plaintiff who is a private figure must prove actual 
malice to receive presumed or punitive damages, see id. at 347, 
but need only prove negligence by the defendant to receive actual 
damages, see Brown v. Kelly Broad. Co., 48 Cal. 3d 711, 742 
(1989). Therefore, the determination of whether the plaintiff is 
a private or public figure is central to a defamation action.
See Denney v. Lawrence, 22 Cal. App. 4th 927, 933 (1994).
There are two kinds of pubic figures. A general public 
figure is someone who has enough common notoriety that he or she 
is a public figure in all matters of public concern. Se^ Gertz, 
418 U.S. at 351. A limited purpose public figure is someone who 
is part of a -particular public controversy and thereby becomes a 
public figure for a limited range of issues- relating to that 
controversy. Id. at 351. The limited public figure attains such 
status due to his or her own voluntary actions, or by being 
-drawn into the particular public controversy- involuntarily.'
Id.
This Court has explained that the determination of public 
figure status should rest upon -evidence of affirmative actions 
by which purported 'public figures' have thrust themselves into
^ This Court has recognized the limited purpose public figure.
Reader's Digest Ass'n. Inc, v. Superior Court (Synanonl, 37 Cal, 3d 
—254 (1984)(-we find that synanon should at the very least be 
classified as a 'limited purpose' public figure for the purposes of 
this general controversy-).
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the forefront of particular controversies .... [S]uch a 
determination is often a close question which can only be 
resolved by considering the totality of the circumstances which 
comprise each individual controversy." Reader*s Digest Ass'n,
Inc. V. Superior Court (Synanon), 37 Cal. 3d 244, 254-55 (1984). 
Once public figure status is achieved, it continues as long as 
the issue creating the public status continues. See Mosesian v. 
McClatchy Newspapers, 233 Cal. App. 3d 1685, 1703 (1991). 
Moreover, "the person remains a public figure thereafter for 
purposes of later commentary on that controversy." Id.
The standard of review this Court should use to determine 
whether Khawar is a limited purpose public figure is de novo 
because this is a mixed question of law and fact. See Denney, 22 
Cal. App. 4th 927, 933. In People v. Louis, 42 Cal. 3d 969, 985 
(1987), the California Supreme Court explained how a mixed 
question should be reviewed.
The review of mixed questions of law and fact can be divided 
into a three-step process. See id. at 985. First, the court 
must determine the facts in dispute, which calls for an abuse of 
discretion standard. See id. Second, the court determines the 
rule of law, which requires the de novo standard. See id. The 
third step, where the court applies the facts to the law, may 
require deference to the trial court in some situations, and may 
require a continued de novo standard in others. See id. at 985- 
87. If the application of the facts to the law requires inquiry 
that is primarily factual then the substantial evidence standard 
is used. See id. at 987. If the court has to "exercise judgment 
about the values that animate legal principles* then the de novo 
standard applies. Id. As the Court explained in Louis, de novo
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review is favored in step three when the mixed question of law 
and fact "implicates constitutional rights." Id-
Louis cited Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), in which 
the United States Supreme Court held the mixed question of law 
and fact in determining probable cause should be reviewed de novo 
because the "inquiry involved [went] well beyond the facts of the 
case and require[d] consideration of the abstract legal 
principles that inform constitutional jurisprudence." Louis, 42 
Cal. 3d at 987. In this case, the mixed question implicates 
First Amendment constitutional rights with regard to the amount 
of protection that will be allotted to Globe for its speech. The 
standard of review for the application of the facts to the law in 
this case should therefore be de novo.
A. Because Khawar Voluntarily Placed Himself Near Kennedy 
And Capitalized Upon His Photo Opportunity With The 
Senator, Khawar Is A Public Figure For The Discussion 
Of Matters Surrounding Rob^t Kennedy's Assassination.
In this case, Khawar is a limited purpose public figure for 
discussion surrounding his presence at Robert Kennedy's 
assassination. The trial court, and the court below, both 
misapplied the law to the facts of the case to find otherwise.
In Brewer v. Memphis Pub. Co., Inc., 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 
1980), the court dealt with a novel issue of defamation law. The 
court had to determine the classification of two people, married 
to each other, as either public or private figures. ^ id^ at 
1241. The novelty was in the fact that one of the people, Anita 
Brewer, had achieved her public figure status from an affair with 
Elvis Presley years earlier. See id^ at 1248. Although Anita 
Brewer never said she arranged pictures to be taken of herself 
with Elvis Presley, she did testify that "I don't think anyone
8
ever had to call anybody. They (photographers) automatically
turned up.* Id. at 1248. Press coverage of Anita's relationship 
was tied with coverage of her career as an entertainer. See id. 
More than ten years after the affair, Memphis Publishing 
published a report that Anita had been in Las Vegas recently to 
see Presley. See id. at 1240. The article insinuated that she 
was there for a romantic meeting. See id. at 1245. Anita, who 
was married, filed the defamation action. See id. at 1240.
In looking at Gertz for guidance, the Brewer court came to 
the conclusion that this was a situation with which Gertz had not 
dealt. The court, in determining that Anita was a public figure 
with respect to discussions of Presley, explained that "Gertz did 
not define all subcategories of the limited purpose public figure 
classification." Brewer, 626 F.2d at 1254. Gertz dealt only 
with the subcategory which applied to the plaintiff in that case. 
See id. The language used in Gertz indicates that other 
subcategories of the limited purpose public figure exist, but 
Gertz did not discuss them.^ See id.
"In describing the whole class of public figures the court 
included those who seek public attention or whose achievements 
gain notoriety, and commented that all public figures 'invite 
attention and comment' and, later, that they 'assume special 
prominence in the resolution of public questions.'" Id. The 
Brewer court agreed with Gertz that the determination of what is 
a public question was too difficult and thus they would not
^ Brewer pointed to three examples of language indicating that Gertz 
did not deal with all subcategories of the limited purpose public 
figure. Gertz's use of the qualifiers "for the most part," "some," 
and "more commonly" all suggested that Gertz acknowledged the 
existence of subcategories of limited purpose public figures beyond 
people who involved themselves in public controversies like the 
specific plaintiff in Gertz. Brewer, 626 F.2d at 1254.
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attempt to answer it. See id. Therefore, Brewer explained that 
the primary focus should be on the plaintiff's actions in seeking 
publicity and voluntarily engaging in activities that pose risk 
of exposure to the public. See id. The fact that Anita was not 
in the public eye at the time of publication did not reduce her 
to a private figure because the article of defamation related *to 
one cause of Anita's fame, her relationship with Presley." Id. 
at 1257.
The use of his voluntary interaction in the public matter of 
Robert Kennedy's assassination brings Khawar into the realm of 
the limited purpose public figure for all discussions of that 
matter, even though those discussions may not have been foreseen. 
Khawar voluntarily placed himself in a position near Kennedy.
(R.T. 1340, 1389-90.) Khawar took that position and gave his 
camera to a friend so that a photo could be taken of him with the 
Senator. (R.T. 1340.) Khawar knew that the press was taking 
pictures of Kennedy and that he was likely to be in published 
photos as a result of his proximity to Kennedy. (R.T. 1339,
1345, 1348, 1389, 1390-91.) This potential publicity did not 
deter Khawar from maintaining his close proximity.
Khawar displayed the photo taken of himself and Kennedy 
prominently in his office. (R.T. 1357.) Khawar hung the photo 
so that anyone meeting him there could see it. (R.T. 1358.) 
Khawar left the photo on the wall of his office for over twenty 
years and removed it only after the Globe article was published. 
(R.T. 1357-58, 1423.)
Khawar was not a politician. He did not intend his brush 
with history to influence political matters. But he did intend 
that it influence others in his community. Specifically, he left
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the photo in a location where anyone who worked for him would see 
it while in his office. (R.T. 1358.) This was "at least a 
couple thousand" people according to Khawar. (R.T. 1359: 9-12.) 
This photo of himself with Senator Kennedy was not intended to 
allow Khawar to influence other's politics, but it was used to 
boost his own influence over his employees and people with whom 
he did business. The connection that the photo created between 
Khawar and the senator suggested that Khawar was connected to 
influential people, just as the other photo in Khawar's office of 
Khawar with President Zia of Pakistan did. (R.T. 1358, 1422.) 
Khawar used the public event to augment his own powers of 
influence with the people he met in his office.
Khawar's actions present the type of unusual situation that 
the Brewer court had to deal with and which the Gertz Court did 
not. There is no indication that either of the courts below even 
considered the Brewer court's perspective. Such perspective, 
however, is the proper analysis to apply when reviewing de novo 
the application of the law to the facts in this case. Khawar's 
actions qualify him as a public figure with regard to the 
assassination of Kennedy because he used his brush with Kennedy 
on the night of the assassination to gain himself a piece of 
notoriety and to create the illusion of influence by association. 
Just as Anita Brewer was a public figure because of the regional 
notoriety she gained from her affair with Elvis Presley, see 
Brewer, 626 F.2d at 1253-54, Khawar is also a public figure 
because he capitalized on his photo opportunity with Senator 
Kennedy.
Additionally, Brewer is analogous with this case in that the 
court considered Anita to be a public figure for only the limited
11
purpose of discussion regarding her relationship with Presley.
See Brewer, 626 F.2d at 1257. In this case. Globe's article 
dealt specifically with Khawar's relationship to Robert Kennedy 
on the night their paths crossed. Therefore Khawar is still a
public figure for that limited purpose.
As Brewer explained, the rationale of Gert^ extends beyond 
those who use notoriety to influence politics and covers those 
who chance whatever fame they can get, in whatever manner they 
can get it, to use it for their own purposes. Brewer, 626
F.2d at 1254-55. Khawar presents this Court with such a case and 
therefore should be classified as a public figure for all speech 
regarding the night he sought out his piece of notoriety: the 
night of Robert Kennedy's assassination.
B. Khawar .ghnuld Be Classified As A Public Figure Fo_r
Speech Regarding The Assassination Of Ro^t Kennedy
To Insure That Speech On Matters Of Public Concern
Remains Open.
The purpose of the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution goes beyond the principle that free citizens should 
be able to speak freely. 'The First Amendment was fashioned to 
assure unfettered interchange of ideas.” Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. 
V. Greenmoss Builders. Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 {1985) (quoting 
Roth V. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
The freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment is 
not just a right, but one of the pillars upon which the Framers 
intended this society to stand. ^ Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
It insures that the electorate is informed on matters of public 
concern. The protection of speech on matters of public concern 
is the core of the First Amendment. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. 
at 258-59 (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776
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(1978)). This is because *[s]peech concerning public affairs is 
more than self expression; it is the essence of self government." 
Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 759 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana^ 
379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)), Therefore, speech on public matters 
is "entitled to special protection" under the First Amendment.
Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 759 (quoting NAACP v. Clairborne 
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1980)).
In Rosenbloom V. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 41-43 
(1971), Justice Brennan applied the above principles and purpose 
of the First Amendment to reject a defamation suit. "Freedom of 
discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this 
nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed 
or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the 
exigencies of their period." Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 41 (quoting 
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)). To determine 
what speech garners the fullest protection of the First 
Amendment, Justice Brennan drew the line at the matter spoken of 
itself. Justice Brennan's logic was straightforward: if the 
purpose of the First Amendment is to protect speech regarding 
matters of public concern, then draw the line in the protection 
of speech between matters of public concern and matters of 
private concern. Rosenbloom. 403 U.S. at 43.
The Court in Gertz broke with Justice Brennan's logic and 
held that in defamation actions the courts must determine whether 
the defamed person is a public or private figure. See Gertz, 418 
U.S. at 343, This was a concession to the reputational interest 
of the individual. Justice Brennan's reasoning, however, showed 
how the Gertz Court's focus on the individual, instead of the 
matter, may undermine the purpose of the First Amendment.
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If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it 
cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private 
individual is involved, or because in some sense the 
individual did not 'voluntarily' choose to become involved.
The public's primary interest is in the event; the public 
focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, 
effect, and significance of the conduct, not the 
participant's prior anonymity or notoriety.
Rosenbloom, 403 U.S, at 43.
The assassination of a United States senator who was favored 
as the next President, is without a doubt a matter of public 
concern. See id. at 43 {a "community has a vital interest in the 
proper enforcement of its criminal laws") . Extending Gertz s 
concession to the individual's reputational interest to the 
extent that it denies speakers the full protection of the First 
Amendment in this case would undercut the purpose of the First 
Amendment. The court decides whether the defamed is a private or 
public figure in determining the protection the defendant will be 
afforded by the First Amendment. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343. 
However, the court should also consider the importance of the 
subject matter in the defamation itself in deciding whether the 
defamed is a public or private figure. This insures that Justice 
Brennan's criticism that Gertz will result in arbitrary 
distinctions affecting First Amendment protections will not hold 
to be true.
The fact that the accusation in this case turned out to be 
false should not lead this Court to allocate less than full First 
Amendment protection because
some abuse of First Amendment freedoms is tolerated only to 
insure that would-be commentators on events of public or 
general interest are not 'deterred from voicing their 
criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even 
though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can
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tbe proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do 
so. '
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 365 (Brennan, J., dissenting){quoting 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279).
Because Khawar intentionally placed himself near Kennedy on 
the night of the assassination and later used that photo 
opportunity to augment his personal influence, Khawar is a 
limited purpose public figure. Furthermore, in accordance with 
the purpose of the First Amendment to keep the pubic informed on 
matters of public concern, Khawar should be ruled a public figure 
for speech regarding the assassination of Robert Kennedy. 
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the court below to 
enter judgment in accordance with the finding that Khawar is a 
limited purpose public figure.
II. THE APPELLATE COURT'S REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE A
CONSTITUTIONALLY-BASED PRIVILEGE OF NEUTRAL REPORTAGE 
VIOLATED GLOBE'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS.
At common law, one who republished the defamatory statements 
of another was considered as equally liable for defamation as the 
original defamer. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 
(1977). Dissatisfaction with this harsh rule of strict 
liability, however, led to the development of various 
privileges.^ One such privilege was established in the landmark 
case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, in which the Supreme 
Court held that public official plaintiffs could only establish
"Voluntary consent" by the defamed grants an absolute privilege to 
the defamer. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 (1977). The 
"privilege of fair comment' grants the news media a conditional 
privilege to publish defamatory opinions on matters of public 
concern, where the opinion is that of the publisher, and is not 
published solely to harm the defamed individual. I^ at § 566. The 
'privilege of fair report" grants publishers a privilege to publish 
accurate accounts of official actions or proceedings. Id. at § 611.
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defamation liability by proving that the defendant acted with 
-actual malice,* that is, that the defendant either knew that the 
defamatory statement was false or acted with a reckless disregard 
as to its falsity. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
279-80 (1964). The Court explained that some defamatory speech 
must be permitted to avoid -chilling" speech that the 
constitution was designed to protect. Id. at 271-72. In 
addition, the Court noted that false statements are -inevitable- 
in free debate, and must be protected if the freedoms of 
expression are to have the -breathing space" that they need to 
survive. I^ (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 435 
(1963)). In explaining its departure from the common law rule, 
the Court noted that its decision had been formulated -against 
the background of a profound national commitment to the principle 
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and 
wide-open . . . Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
In 1977, the Second Circuit created yet another 
constitutionally-based privilege which it termed the -neutral 
reportage privilege." See Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y,
Inc., 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 1977). The Edwards privilege 
protects the news media's neutral and accurate republication of 
newsworthy defamatory statements when made by a responsible and 
prominent organization about a public figure, even if the 
reporter knows that the defamatory statements are false. See 
The Edwards court explained that, under the First Amendment, 
-[t]he public interest in being fully informed about 
controversies that often rage around sensitive issues demands 
that the press be afforded the freedom to report such charges
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without assuming responsibility for them." Id. Thus, the 
Edwards court created a constitutionally-based privilege that 
granted republishers of defamatory statements even more 
protection than that provided by the Supreme Court in Sullivan.
The neutral reportage privilege provides a type of 
protection distinct from that provided by Sullivan's "actual 
malice" standard. The privilege articulated by the Supreme Court 
in Sullivan protects publishers of defamatory statements who do 
not publish with knowledge that the defamatory statements are 
false or with a reckless disregard as to their falsity. See 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80. Conversely, the neutral reportage 
privilege protects republishers of defamatory statements 
regardless of the republisher's knowledge of or concern for the 
statements' validity. S^ Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120. The neutral 
reportage privilege, therefore, protects republishers who may 
possess actual malice under the Sullivan test. Thus, the neutral 
reportage privilege and the Sullivan privilege are complimentary.
A. Neither The Supreme Court Nor Any California State 
Court Has Addressed The Neutral Reportage Privilege.
The Supreme Court has never explicitly reviewed the neutral 
reportage privilege. See Scott Saef, Neutral Reportage: The 
Case for a Statutory Privilege, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 417, 419 n.l7 
(1992). In 1989, however. Justice Blackmun criticized a 
defendant's decision to "eshew[] any reliance on the 'neutral 
reportage defense,'" a "strategic decision" that "appear[ed] to 
have been unwise in light of the facts of th[at] case." Harte- 
Hanks Communications, Inc, v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 694-95 
(1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun commented:
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“Were this Court to adopt the neutral reportage theory, the facts 
of this case arguably might fit within it." Id. Justice 
Blackmun's comments thus indicate that the Supreme Court may look 
favorably on the neutral reportage privilege.
California State courts have likewise never addressed 
whether the neutral reportage privilege exists in this state.
See formerly published at Khawar v. Globe Int^1, Inc., 54 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 92. 102-03 (1996). The United States District Courts 
for both the Northern and Central Districts of California, 
however, have adopted the neutral reportage privilege. See Bar^ 
V. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1984),- see also 
Ward v. News Group Int^l Ltd., 733 F. Supp. 83, 86 (C.D. Cal.
1990). Whether Globe is entitled to invoke the neutral reportage 
privilege under the facts of this case is a mixed question of law 
and fact that implicates Globe's constitutional rights.
Therefore, this Court should review the appellate court's finding 
on this issue de novo. See People v. Louis, 42 Cal. 3d 969, 987 
(1987).
The Edwards court adopted merely one of the various 
formulations of the neutral reportage privilege. The privilege 
has since met with varied judicial receptivity in other 
jurisdictions. Several courts have adopted various formulations 
of the Edwards privilege, while others have declined to do so for 
three primary reasons. First, courts have criticized the Edwards 
privilege on the grounds that its focus on the subject matter of 
the defamation runs afoul of Supreme Court defamation 
jurisprudence. See Dickey v. CBS Inc., 583 F.2d 1221, 1229 (3rd
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Cir. 1978) , Second, defamation jurisprudence has traditionally 
held that defamatory speech is not protected by the First 
Amendment. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 
(1942); see also Dorothy A. Bowles, Neutral Reportage as a 
Defense Against Republishing Libel, 11 Comm. & L. 3, 9 (Mar.
1989) (arguing that "the lack of a uniformily accepted theoretical 
basis for the doctrine has resulted in its uneven application*). 
Third, courts have rejected the Edwards privilege on the grounds 
that it underprotects plaintiffs' reputational interests. See 
Hogan v. Herald Co., 84 A.D.2d 470, 478 (1982)(arguing that 
Edwards "upset" the balance of rights previously established by 
the Supreme Court in Sullivan and Gertz).
Notably, these courts have rejected Edwards' formulation of 
the neutral reportage privilege. This Court, however, has the 
ability to adopt its own formulation of the privilege. Indeed, 
this case represents the perfect opportunity for this Court to 
adopt a formulation of the neutral reportage privilege that is 
immune from the concerns of the courts that have rejected other 
formulations of the privilege.
B. The Neutral Reportage Privilege Proposed By Globe
Ameliorates The Concerns Voiced By Courts Which Have
Rejected Other Formulations Of The Privilege.
This court should adopt a constitutionally-based privilege 
of neutral reportage that protects the news media from defamation 
liability when it republishes defamatory statements where: (1) 
the defamatory statements involve a matter of public concern; (2) 
the defamatory statements are made by, or about a public figure; 
(3) the republication is an accurate and neutral account of the
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defamatory statements; and (4) the defamatory statements are made 
by a prominent source. This formulation of the neutral reportage 
privilege comports with the current focus of the Supreme Court's 
constitutional defamation analysis, protects only that category 
of speech that warrants First Amendment protection, and provides 
a reasonable degree of protection to the reputational interests 
of plaintiffs like Khawar. Thus, Globe's formulation of the 
neutral reportage privilege addresses the concerns of courts that 
have rejected other formulations of the privilege.
Globe's formulation of the neutral reportage privilege 
comports with the current focus of the Supreme Court's current 
defamation jurisprudence. Since Gertz, the Supreme Court has 
refocused its defamation analysis once again on the content of 
the allegedly defamatory speech, in effect reviving the subject 
matter test first implemented in Rosenbloom and later repudiated 
in Gertz.
In Landmark Communications, Inc, v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 
839 (1978), the Court overturned a criminal sanction that had 
been imposed on a newspaper because the paper had published 
material of utmost public concern. The Court has also allowed a 
private figure to recover presumed damages from a defendant 
without showing actual malice where the false and defamatory 
speech did not discuss a matter of public concern. See Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc, v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 
(1985); see also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc, v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 
767, 775 (1986)(holding that plaintiffs must overcome a higher 
standard of liability when the defamatory speech involves a 
matter of public concern). Moreover, the Court has explained
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that in situations involving media defendants, a plaintiff must 
prove the falsity of statements on matters of public concern 
before liability arises under state defamation law. See 
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1990).
These rulings clearly undercut the Gertz Court's reasoning 
that courts should not bear the burden of making qualitative, 
subject matter determinations. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974). In addition, these opinions indicate 
that the public concern/private concern subject matter 
distinction remains a viable doctrine under the First Amendment 
for protecting the republication of defamatory speech. See 
Bowles, supra, 11 Comm. & L. at 9- Globe's formulation of the 
neutral reportage privilege focuses on the subject matter of the 
defamation, thereby bringing it in line with the current focus of 
the Supreme Court's defamation jurisprudence.
In light of the Supreme Court's renewed focus on the subject 
matter of the defamation, the Edwards formulation of the neutral 
reportage privilege is in line with the Court's current focus to 
the extent that it focuses on the newsworthiness of the 
defamation. See Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120. Both courts and 
commentators, however, have rejected the Edwards formulation of 
the neutral reportage privilege on the grounds that this 
newsworthiness standard is “broader than necessary to serve the 
purposes of the First Amendment." Justin Wertman, The 
Newsworthiness Requirement of the Privilege of Neutral Reportage
is a Matter of Public Concern. 65 Fordham L. Rev. 789, 816 
(1996). Globe's formulation of the neutral reportage privilege, 
however, is immune from this concern precisely because it
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proposes a narrower standard designed to protect only that type 
of speech that truly warrants First Amendment protection.
C. Limiting The Protection Of The Neutral Reportage
Privilege To The Republication Of Defamatory Statements^
That Involve Matters Of "Public Concern*^ Ensures That
The Privilege Protects Only That Type Of Speech That Is
Protected By The First Amendment.
The neutral reportage privilege proposed by Globe would 
protect only that category of republished defamation that 
involves a matter of public concern, thereby ensuring that only 
speech that falls squarely within the protection of the First 
Amendment is protected. The Supreme Court has recognized that 
not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance. See Dun & 
Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 758. However, the Court has repeatedly 
explained that matters of public concern rest at the heart of the 
First Amendment's protection. See, e.g., Hepps, 475 U.S. at 775- 
78; Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 755-57; First Nat'l Bank y_._ 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269-70.
In Connic)c v. Myers, the Court recognized matters of public 
concern as a "content-based category of privileged 'public issue' 
speech protected by the First Amendment." Cynthia L. Estlund, 
Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging
First Amendment Category, 59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1990). In 
Connick, the Court held that Myers had not raised a 
constitutional claim because the speech at issue did not involve 
a matter of public concern. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 
154 (1983) .
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The Court has similarly recognized the value of speech 
involving matters of public concern in the defamation context.
See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761-762. In Dun, the Court 
echoed the majority opinion in Connick in holding that matters of 
private concern do not implicate the First Amendment where 
private figure plaintiffs are involved. See id. Thus, by 
limiting its protection to speech that involves a matter of 
public concern. Globe's formulation of the neutral reportage 
privilege encompasses only that type of speech that is truly 
deserving of First Amendment protection.
D. The Neutral Reportage Privilege Proposed By Globe
Adequately Protects The Reputational Interests Of
Plaintiffs Like Khawar.
In the neutral reportage context, two recognized rights 
compete for supremacy: (1) the plaintiff's right to protect his 
or her reputation; and (2) the news media's constitutional right 
to republish certain types of defamatory speech. The court below 
used misguided analysis to balance these two interests. The 
court below cited this Court's analysis in Brown v. Kelly Broad., 
interpreting this analysis as holding that the "news media must 
not be privileged to report in a way which may unreasonably 
undermine individual rights because a 'reasonable degree of 
protection for a private individual's reputation is essential to 
our system of ordered liberty.'" Khawar, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 104 
(quoting Brown v. Kelly Broad. Co., 48 Cal. 3d 711, 743 
(1989))(emphasis added). While the analysis in Brown may have 
been instructive, it should not have been dispositive because in
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Brown, this Court was not considering the neutral reportage 
privilege.
In Brown, this Court was balancing the reputational 
interests of plaintiffs against the news media's right to publish 
defamatory statements under section 47(3) of the California Civil 
Code. See id. at 711. The court below failed to recognize the 
highly significant differences between these two privileges. The 
privilege afforded by section 47(3) protects the news media when 
it republishes a defamatory communication "without malice on 
occasions in which the speaker and the recipient of the 
communication share a common interest." contrast, the
neutral reportage privilege protects the republication of 
defamatory statements in certain situations without regard to 
whether the republisher acted with "actual malice" in the 
Sullivan sense. Therefore, while the court below properly 
included a balancing of these competing interests in its 
analysis, it improperly relied on this court's reasoning in Brown 
to find that a plaintiff's interest in protecting his or her
reputation outweighs the news media's First Amendment interest in 
republishing defamatory statements under any formulation of the
neutral reportage privilege.
An appropriate balancing analysis, on the other hand, 
reveals that Globe's formulation of the neutral reportage
privilege provides a reasonable degree of protection to 
plaintiffs' reputations. Whenever the news media invokes the 
neutral reportage privilege to republish speech deserving of 
First Amendment protection, the reputations of plaintiffs like 
Khawar will arguably suffer. However, the First Amendment
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freedoms of speech and press could not exist if the state placed 
greater importance on the reputational interests of the 
occasional individual who may be harmed. See Edwards, 556 F.2d 
at 122. The Supreme Court has likewise observed that “[tlhe risk 
of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society 
which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press." 
Time, Inc, v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967). While a 
plaintiff's reputation may suffer, however, each of the 
requirements that must be met to invoke Globe's formulation of 
the neutral reportage privilege serves to mitigate this harm, 
thereby affording the plaintiff's reputation a reasonable degree 
of protection.
As explained, requiring that republished allegations involve 
a matter of public concern ensures that republishers will be able 
to invoke the neutral reportage privilege only when its 
protection is truly warranted by the First Amendment. Thus, the 
privilege proposed by Globe ensures that the defamatory 
allegations are republished for a purpose other than to injure 
the plaintiff's reputation. Similarly, requiring that the 
defamatory statements be made by or about a public figure 
increases the probability that the republished allegations 
involve matters of public concern. Requiring the republication 
to be a neutral and accurate account of the defamatory statements 
likewise protects plaintiffs' reputations by ensuring that the 
media will not be protected when it attempts to launch its own 
defamatory attacks under the guise of informing the public about 
matters of public concern. Finally, requiring that the 
defamatory statements be made by a prominent source increases the
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likelihood that the accusations are true, and if false, at least 
limits the privilege to speech that the public has a strong 
interest in hearing. Thus, the individual requirements that must 
be met to invoke Globe's formulation of the privilege ensure 
that, given the overriding importance of the media's First 
Amendment interests, plaintiffs' reputations are provided a 
reasonable degree of protection.
Other practical considerations provide reputational 
protection in addition to that provided by Globe's formulation of 
the neutral reportage privilege. Plaintiffs are not left without 
a remedy when the news media invokes the neutral reportage 
privilege. Globe proposes a privilege that in no way precludes 
plaintiffs like Khawar from bringing a defamation action against 
the original defamer. While the news media may arguably magnify 
the potential for reputational harm by republishing defamatory 
statements, the original defamer remains liable for the full 
extent of any reasonably foreseeable harm. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 576 (1977). Neither does the neutral 
reportage privilege proposed by Globe preclude plaintiffs like 
Khawar from using the media to rebut the defamatory charges. 
Indeed, Khawar conducted a televised interview in which he denied 
any involvement in Senator Kennedy's assassination. (R.T. 881.) 
These practical considerations further indicate that plaintiffs 
in Khawar's situation are provided with a reasonable degree of 
reputational protection.
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E. Globe Met Every Requirement Necessary To Invoke The
Proposed Formulation Of The Neutral Reportage
Privilege.
The Globe article republished speech that involved a matter 
of public concern. The Supreme Court has explained that matters 
of public concern include *all issues about which information is 
needed or appropriate to cope with the exigencies of . . , [the] 
period." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
Moreover, matters that concern the governing of the nation are 
properly characterized as of public concern. See Alexander 
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 245, 256. The Globe article reported on a controversy that 
both concerned the governing of our nation and created widespread 
public interest in resolving the controversy. Thus, the Globe 
article touched a matter of public concern.
The Globe article reported on a controversy that concerned 
the governing of our nation. Political assassinations represent 
a grave and direct threat to the free election system that 
represents one of the basic tenants of our democratic political 
system. A controversy that involves such dire implications is 
just the sort of periodic exigency that the Supreme Court thought 
justified the need for public information and education. See 
Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 102. Moreover, the record indicates that 
Senator Kennedy's assassination created international public 
interest. (R.T. 690-91.) In addition, the California State 
Archives assembled a collection of approximately 60,000 documents 
related to both the assassination and the subsequent 
investigations of the FBI and various police departments. (R.T.
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692.) Such facts indicate that the public has a legitimate and 
widespread interest in resolving this controversy. Senator 
Kennedy's assassination and the resulting investigation it 
produced related to the governing of the nation and created 
widespread public interest. Thus the Globe article reported on a 
matter of public concern.
The defamatory statements in the Globe article were made by 
or about a public figure. As explained in section I, Khawar, the 
target of the defamatory statements, was a limited purpose public 
figure. Thus, this requirement is satisfied. However, if this 
Court determines that Khawar is not a public figure for the 
purposes of this appeal, this requirement is still satisfied 
because Morrow, the source of the defamatory statements, was a
limited purpose public figure as well.
The Supreme Court has explained that an individual who 
voluntarily injects himself into, or engages the public's 
attention to influence the outcome of a particular public 
controversy thereby becomes a public figure with respect to a 
limited range of issues relating to that controversy. See Gertz, 
418 U.S. at 351-52. Morrow sought to inject himself into the 
controversy surrounding Senator Kennedy's assassination by 
writing a book about it. (R-T. 704-705.) Morrow likewise 
attempted to influence the outcome of this controversy by using 
his book to promulgate an alternative theory about the identity 
of Kennedy's true assassin. See id. Moreover, while 
participating in a panel discussion held at an assassination 
researcher's conference. Morrow expounded upon the theories
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articulated in his book. (R.T. 2149-51.) Morrow's actions show 
that he voluntarily injected himself into a public controversy to 
engage the public's attention in an attempt to influence the 
controversy's outcome, thereby rendering himself a limited 
purpose public figure under the test enunciated in Gertz.
The record likewise indicates that the Globe article was a 
neutral account of the charges alleged by Morrow. The Globe 
article expressly stated that the charges it was recounting were 
made by Morrow. (R.T. 3145.) Moreover, on cross-examination, 
Khawar's own expert witness agreed that the article's pervasive 
use of disclaiming phrases served to inform readers that Globe 
was not standing behind the charges that it was reporting on, but 
was merely reporting that the charges were made by another 
individual. (R.T. 859-63.) Furthermore, Blackburn, the author 
of the article, attempted to contact Ali Ahmand, the individual 
Morrow names as Kennedy's true assassin in his book. (R.T. 1121- 
22.) Thus, under even the most exacting definition of “neutral 
reporting," the record indicates that the Globe article was a 
neutral account of the charges alleged by Morrow.
The Globe article similarly constituted an accurate account 
of the charges alleged by Morrow. The record indicates that in 
preparing to write the article, Blackburn interviewed Morrow and 
read Morrow's book thoroughly. (R.T. 1092, 1101.) Blackburn 
likewise repeatedly asserted that the statements in the Globe 
article were direct quotes either from Morrow's book, or from 
what Morrow told Blackburn during the interview. (R.T. 1104-05, 
1108-10.) Thus, the precautions Blackburn took in writing the
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Globe article indicate that the article represented an accurate 
account of the charges made by Morrow.
The defamatory statements at issue were made by a prominent 
source. For the purposes of invoking Globe's formulation of the 
neutral reportage privilege. Morrow should be considered a 
prominent source of the defamatory statements republished in the 
Globe article. Morrow has written three books on the 
assassinations of former United States political leaders. (R.T. 
704, 841, 883.) In fact, the information contained in Morrow's 
first book. Betrayal, coupled with additional confidential 
information Morrow supplied to Congressman Downing, "helped make 
the creation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations 
possible." (R.T. 843.) Moreover, both Morrow and his third 
book. Firsthand Knowledge, were featured on both a nationally 
syndicated television program and a news program in Cincinnati. 
(R.T. 883-84, 1600.) Furthermore, Morrow had run for Congress in 
Maryland and was acquainted with such prominent political leaders 
as Richard Nixon, Barry Goldwater, and former FBI director 
Clarence Kelly. (R.T. 883-84.) Finally, there is evidence that 
suggests that Morrow has done work for the CIA. (R.T. 847.)
These facts indicate that, in the context of commentating on 
government and political assassinations. Morrow should be
considered a prominent source.
The court below violated Globe's First Amendment rights by 
refusing to recognize a neutral reportage privilege that would 
shield Globe from defamation liability under the facts of this 
case. Globe's formulation of the neutral reportage privilege
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comports with current Supreme Court defamation jurisprudence, 
protects only that type of speech deserving of First Amendment 
protection, and provides the reputational interests of plaintiffs 
like Khawar a reasonable degree of protection. For these 
reasons. Globe's formulation of the neutral reportage privilege 
ameliorates the concerns of other courts that have rejected the 
Edwards privilege. Finally, Globe met every requirement 
necessary to invoke its formulation of the neutral reportage 
privilege. Therefore this Court should adopt Globe's formulation 
of the neutral reportage doctrine and reverse the judgment of the 
court below.
III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE UNWARRANTED IN THIS CASE BECAUSE
GLOBE'S ACTIONS DO NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENT OF THE ACTUAL 
MALICE STANDARD.
Because the trier of fact in a defamation action must find 
actual malice by clear and convincing proof, and not by just a 
preponderance of the evidence, the reviewing court independently 
reviews the lower court's award of punitive damages. See McCoy 
V. Hearst Corp., 42 Cal. 3d 835, 842 (1986).
The question of whether the evidence in the record in a 
defamation case is of the convincing clarity required to 
strip the utterance of First Amendment protection is not 
merely a question for the trier of fact. Judges, as 
expositors of the Constitution, must independently decide 
whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross 
the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any 
judgment that is not supported by clear and convincing proof 
of 'actual malice.'
at 842 (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United 
States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510-11 (1984)).
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In making its review, the court “must independently review 
all the evidence presented on the issue of actual malice. It may 
not restrict itself ... to evidence favorable to the judgment." 
McCoy, 42 Cal. 3d at 845. Unlike substantial evidence review, 
the independent review done by the court may "involve review of 
evidence which , , . would be considered 'discredited' under 
usual rules of appellate review by virtue of the jury verdict in 
favor of respondents." Id. at 845-46, The reviewing court does 
not have to consider actual malice evidence "in the light most 
favorable to respondents or [] draw all permissible inferences in 
favor of respondents." Id. at 846. "Finally, if warranted, this 
court may . . . substitute its own inferences on the issue of
actual malice for those drawn by tbe trier of fact." Id.
A public figure can only recover damages in a defamation 
suit if he or she can prove actual malice by the defendant. See 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280-81 (1964). 
Because defamation is a constitutional standard, the evidence 
must prove actual malice with "convincing clarity." Id. at 285- 
86. Furthermore, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 
the Court held that a private figure need not show actual malice 
to recover compensatory/actual damages, but still had to show 
actual malice under Sullivan to recover punitive damages. See 
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
Actual malice,exists if the defendant knows that a statement 
is false, or recklessly disregards whether the statement is false 
or not. S^ Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280-81. The plaintiff must
^ The substitution of the court's own inferences is particularly 
suitable for cases where key witnesses failed to testify at trial and 
their testimony was only offered through deposition records. See 
McCoy, 42 Cal. 3d at 846, n.8. In this case, Blac)cburn's testimony 
is entirely from video-taped deposition. (R.T. 1077.)
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provide clear and convincing proof of the defendant's knowledge 
or reckless disregard. See McCoy, 42 Cal. 3d at 860. The 
Sullivan court held that failure to discover the falsity of 
statements could show negligence, but is insufficient to prove 
actual malice. 376 U.S. at 287-88. A showing of actual malice 
requires sufficient evidence to allow the conclusion that the 
defendant actually had serious doubts about the truth of the 
publication. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 
(1968). Publication of allegations: (1) without "personal 
knowledge" of the plaintiff's activities; (2) based on 
information from a source for whom there is no evidence showing 
veracity; and (3) after failing "to verify the information with 
those . . . who might have known the facts," does not establish 
actual malice even when all three of those factors exist 
together. Id. at 730. Moreover, "mere proof of failure to 
investigate, without more, cannot establish reckless disregard 
for the truth." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 332.
In this case, there is insufficient evidence to show that 
Globe had a subjective knowledge that Morrow's accusation was 
false, or that Globe recklessly disregarded whether Morrow's 
accusation was false. Therefore, there is insufficient evidence 
that Globe published the article with actual malice.
A. Blackburn's Lack Of Credibility Does Not Prove Actual
Malice. "
The process of independent review requires this Court to 
look at all of the evidence of actual malice together. See 
McCoy, 42 Cal. 3d at 845-46. Even if the reviewing court agrees 
with the trier of fact's likely assessment that a witness is not 
credible, the court may still decline to infer from that
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witness's testimony the presence of actual malice upon its 
independent review. See Harte~Hanks Communications, Inc, v. 
Connauighton/ 491 U.S. 657, 689, n.35 (1989). The United States 
Supreime Court's analysis in Bose is a clear example of such an 
appli-cation of independent review. See Bose, 466 U.S. at 511-12. 
In Bose, the trial court found that the author of the report at 
issue was not credible. Id. The Court accepted that 
determination; however, the Court was unwilling to infer actual 
malice from that witness's refusal to admit his earlier mistake 
and reversed the trial court and appellate court's findings of 
actual malice. See id. As Bose demonstrates, under independent 
review, a court may not dismiss the trier of fact's credibility 
assessments, but the reviewing court need not bend to them in 
their determination of actual malice either.
In this case, the only direct evidence as to Globe's 
subjective knowledge of falsity or knowing recklessness was the 
videotaped deposition of the article's original writer, John 
BlacBcburn.'' The court below believed that the jury had reason to 
find that Blackburn was not credible. See formerly published at 
Khawar v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 92, 106 (1996).
This determination, however, was not determinative in the 
ind^endent review of whether there is clear and convincing 
evidence of actual malice. See Bose, 466 U.S. at 511-13. The 
determination that Blackburn is not credible does not establish 
actual malice for two reasons. First, "discredited testimony is 
not considered a sufficient basis for drawing a contrary
’ Khawar is likely to cite language from St. Amant where the Court 
indicated that "inherently improbable" allegations may be 
circumstantial evidence of actual malice. 390 U.S. at 732. 'The idea 
that an accomplice to a murder could have gone unapprehended is not a 
reckless one.
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conclusion." Bose, 466 U.S. at 512 (citing Moore v. Chesapeake 
and Ohio R.R. , 340 U.S. 573, 575-76 (1951)). While the trier of 
fact may disregard Blackburn's testimony, it may not use that 
discredited testimony to infer the opposite. Therefore, the 
trier of fact cannot use Blackburn's discredited testimony that 
he did not know or suspect the falsity of Morrow's accusations to 
conclude that Blackburn in fact did know or suspect such falsity.
Second, the fact that a witness made an attempt to defend 
his mistake by asserting that it was not a mistake "does not 
establish that he realized the inaccuracy at the time of 
publication." Bose, 466 U.S. at 512. Blackburn tried to explain 
that he only took notes from interviews of people he intended to 
use in a story. (R.T. 1140-42.) Blackburn was unsure whether he 
might have contacted people associated with the assassination. 
(R.T. 1123, 1127, 1140.) The trier of fact may have considered 
this testimony to be a weak attempt to cover a mistake Blackburn 
realized at the time of the deposition, but realization at the 
deposition does not equal realization of the "inaccuracy at the 
time of the publication," which is required for actual malice. 
Bose, 644 U.S. at 512. Similarly, there was a publication of 
inaccurate information in this case; however, as in Bose, that 
inaccuracy alone is not enough evidence to meet the 
constitutional standard of clear and convincing proof of actual 
malice by Globe. See id. at 511-513.
B. Failure To Locate Khawar Was Not Purposeful Avoidance
And Therefore Did Not Constitute Actual Malice.
A plaintiff may show actual malice by a defendant if the 
defendant purposefully avoided learning facts that might confirm 
the probable falsity of the statements. See Harte-Hanks, 491
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U.s. at 692. Harte-Hanks provides an example of what constitutes 
"purposeful avoidance." In Harte-Hanks, a prosecutor 
(Connaughton) was accused of bribing witnesses testifying before 
a grand jury. See id. at 657. Connaughton was a candidate for 
the municipal bench at that time and the Journal News, defendant 
in the action, supported the incumbent judge. See id.
Connaughton sued the Journal News for defamation upon their 
publication of accusations by a grand jury witness that 
Connaughton had offered her and her sister (Patsy Stephens) "jobs 
and a trip to Florida 'in appreciation' for their help in the 
investigation." Id. In its examination of the record for actual 
malice by Journal News, the Court pointed to two facts which 
indicated "purposeful avoidance" by Journal News. Id■ at 692. 
First, even though Connaughton made them available, no one at 
Journal News bothered to listen to the tapes of Connaughton's 
interviews with the key witness, and accuser's sister, Patsy 
Stephens. See id. Second, even though Journal News knew Patsy 
Stephens was the key witness in the case the paper never 
attempted to interview her. See id. The Court held that this 
evidence was sufficient to show "purposeful avoidance" and thus, 
actual malice. Id. at 692-93.
In contrast. Globe's actions do not show purposeful 
avoidance. In this case, Globe's access to Khawar was not as 
easy as that of Journal News' to Patsy Stephens in Harte-Hanks. 
While Journal News knew Patsy Stephens' real name. Globe did not 
know Khawar's. (R.T. 1122-23.) The man identified in photos as 
Khawar was listed in Morrow's book as Ali Ahmand. (R.T. 1357; 
C.T. 3145.) Khawar chose to give his name to the FBI and LAPD as 
Khalid Iqbal, (R.T. 1383), even though his full name is Khalid
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Iqbal Khawar, (R.T. 1329). As a result, Morrow's book did not 
contain Khawar's last name, but simply listed Ali Ahmand as also 
having the name Khalid Iqbal. (R.T. 1123.) Tracking down Khawar 
in this case is clearly not the simple task which Journal News 
passed up in affirmatively deciding not to interview Patsy 
Stephens.® Another factor distinguishes Globe's actions from 
that of Journal News. While the defamed in Harte-Hanks offered 
Journal News evidence of his innocence, no such evidence was 
offered to or rejected by Globe.® Globe did not purposefully 
avoid finding facts that would show Morrow's accusations were 
false. Rather, Globe simply did not investigate Morrow's claims, 
which is insufficient to support a finding of actual malice. See 
Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 692.
In Antonovich v. Superior Court (Schwellenbach), 234 Cal. 
App. 3d 1041 (1992), the court dealt with a case of defamation 
stemming from comments made by Antonovich that Ward had destroyed 
necessary files the day he handed over the supervisor's office to 
Antonovich. See id. at 1045-46. In holding that Antonovich had 
acted with actual malice, the court pointed specifically to 
Antonovich's refusal to accept Ward's offer to investigate the 
allegation as "a deliberate decision not to acquire knowledge of 
facts that might confirm the probable falsity of [the subject] 
charges." Id. at 1053. This amounted to a "purposeful avoidance
® It should be noted that there is no requirement that a defendant 
even obtain a plaintiff's version of a story before publication. See 
Weingarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 147 (1980).
The public, and therefore Globe, did have access to the archives on 
the RFK assassination, however, those archives total over 60,000 
documents and other exhibits. (R.T. 692.) The incredible size of 
such a record is not even comparable to the limited number of audio 
tapes Connaughton provided for Journal News in Harte-Hanks and it is 
therefore unrealistic to classify a failure to search the entire RFK 
archive as purposeful avoidance.
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Id, atof the truth** and supported "a finding of actual malice.
1053. In this case, the record shows no such affirmative 
evidence that Globe declined to investigate Morrow's claims. The 
record shows only that Globe did not investigate, which under 
Gertz is not clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. See 
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 332.
There is no evidence that Globe declined any offer or 
request to investigate Morrow's accusations. There is no 
evidence that Globe decided not to interview Khawar in order to 
avoid finding evidence of inaccuracy in Morrow's book, but rather 
that Globe simply could not locate Khawar. (R.T. 1120-22.)
There is no evidence of subjective knowledge of falsity, or 
reckless disregard for the truth by Globe at the time of 
publication either. Because clear and convincing evidence is not 
present to find actual malice by Globe, the award of punitive 
damages must be reversed. See McCoy, 42 Cal. 3d at 860.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons. Globe respectfully requests that 
the appellate court's decision affirming the trial court's 
decision be reversed and remanded.
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